

天津外国语大学  
2020 年攻读硕士学位研究生入学考试试题样题（仅供参考）  
考试科目：哲学文献翻译（代码：830）

（注意：答案必须写在答题纸上）  
（考试时间 180 分钟 总分 150 分）

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一、哲学术语英译汉。（每题 1 分，共 20 分）

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|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. intuitionism  | 11. contradiction |
| 2. methodology   | 12. structuralism |
| 3. categories    | 13. nihilism      |
| 4. naturalism    | 14. pluralism     |
| 5. hypothesis    | 15. monad         |
| 6. ontology      | 16. paradox       |
| 7. optimism      | 17. metaphysics   |
| 8. authenticity  | 18. deduction     |
| 9. phenomenology | 19. fallacy       |
| 10. relativism   | 20. contingency   |

二、哲学术语汉译英。（每题 1 分，共 20 分）

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|----------|----------|
| 21. 绝对主义 | 31. 实证主义 |
| 22. 二元论  | 32. 目的论  |
| 23. 一元论  | 33. 唯物论  |
| 24. 悲观主义 | 34. 唯心论  |
| 25. 辩证法  | 35. 存在主义 |
| 26. 范式   | 36. 解构主义 |
| 27. 美学   | 37. 唯名论  |
| 28. 经验论  | 38. 教条主义 |
| 29. 唯理论  | 39. 认识论  |
| 30. 实用主义 | 40. 实体   |

三、判断下列英文哲学著作分别属于哪位哲学家，请对号选择正确答案。（每题 1 分，共 20 分）

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|--|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 41. <i>The Republic</i>                              | A) Socrates     | B) Plato       | C) Thales       |
| 42. <i>Metaphysics</i>                               | A) Aristotle    | B) Democritus  | C) Pyrrhon      |
| 43. <i>Confessions</i>                               | A) Aquinas      | B) Augustine   | C) Abelard      |
| 44. <i>Leviathan</i>                                 | A) Hobbes       | B) Bacon       | C) Locke        |
| 45. <i>Meditations on the First Philosophy</i>       | A) Descartes    | B) Berkeley    | C) Voltaire     |
| 46. <i>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding</i> | A) Hume         | B) Locke       | C) Comte        |
| 47. <i>The Social Contract and Discourses</i>        | A) Rousseau     | B) Montesquieu | C) Lacan        |
| 48. <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>                   | A) Fichte       | B) Parmenides  | C) Kant         |
| 49. <i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i>                   | A) Hegel        | B) Engels      | C) Schelling    |
| 50. <i>On Liberty</i>                                | A) Bentham      | B) Mill        | C) Frege        |
| 51. <i>Monadology</i>                                | A) Leibniz      | B) Spinoza     | C) Saussure     |
| 52. <i>The Principle of Psychology</i>               | A) Peirce       | B) James       | C) Dewey        |
| 53. <i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>                      | A) Cassirer     | B) Nietzsche   | C) Schopenhauer |
| 54. <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>            | A) Wittgenstein | B) Russel      | C) Strawson     |
| 55. <i>Two Dogmas of Empiricism</i>                  | A) Kripke       | B) Putnam      | C) Quine        |
| 56. <i>Being and Time</i>                            | A) Heidegger    | B) Husserl     | C) Foucault     |
| 57. <i>Being and Nothingness</i>                     | A) Kierkegaard  | B) Sartre      | C) Levi-Strauss |
| 58. <i>Philosophy and Logical Syntax</i>             | A) Schlick      | B) Carnap      | C) Searle       |

59. *Philosophy and the Nature of Mirror*

A) McDowell

B) Rorty

C) Davidson

60. *Truth and Method*

A) Dilthey

B) Gadamer

C) Ricoeur

四、阅读下列英文哲学短文，从 ABC 选项中，选择一个正确答案。（每题 2 分，共 30 分）

## I

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances, which occur, of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we *feel* in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was *connected*; but only that it was *conjoined* with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be *connected*. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of *connexion*? Nothing but that he now *feels* these events to be *connected* in his imagination, and can readily foretel the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion, which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.

61. As for Hume, what theory does the passage mainly concern?
  - A) The necessary connexion among events.
  - B) The constant conjunction of events.
  - C) The customary transition of imagination.
62. The idea of necessary connexion among relative events arises \_\_\_\_\_.
  - A) from every single instance
  - B) from one instance to another
  - C) from many similar instances
63. When we say that one object is connected with another, we mean \_\_\_\_\_.
  - A) that they give rise to a related inference
  - B) that they become proofs of each other's existence
  - C) both A) and B)
64. According to Hume, if a conclusion can discover \_\_\_\_\_, it can be disagreeable to skepticism.
  - A) the insufficiency of human reason and capacity
  - B) the general difference of human understanding
  - C) the narrow limits of human reason and capacity
65. In your opinion, Hume is a (an) \_\_\_\_\_ philosopher.
  - A) empiricist
  - B) rational
  - C) enlightened

## II

The situation can not be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. This does not mean that it can not be conditioned by the *Mit-sein* like all other phenomena of human reality, but the *Mit-sein* can call forth bad faith only by presenting itself as a situation which bad faith permits surpassing; bad faith does not come from outside to human reality. One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. But consciousness affects itself with bad faith. There must be an original intention and a project of bad faith; this project implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective apprehension (of) consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my

capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully-and this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to reestablish a semblance of duality-but in the unitary structure of a single project. How then can the lie subsist if the duality which conditions it is suppressed?

To this difficulty is added another which is derived from the total translucency of consciousness. That which affects itself with bad faith must be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being of consciousness is consciousness of being. It appears then that I must be in good faith, at least to the extent that I am conscious of my bad faith. But then this whole psychic system is annihilated. We must agree in fact that if I deliberately and cynically attempt to lie to myself, I fail completely in this undertaking; the lie falls back and collapses beneath my look; it is ruined from behind by the very consciousness of lying to myself which pitilessly constitutes itself well within my project as its very condition. We have here an evanescent phenomenon which exists only in and through its own differentiation. To be sure, these phenomena are frequent and we shall see that there is in fact an "evanescence" of bad faith, which, it is evident, vacillates continually between good faith and cynicism: Even though the existence of bad faith is very precarious, and though it belongs to the kind of psychic structures which we might call "metastable,"<sup>2</sup> it presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It can even be the normal aspect of life for a very great number of people. A person can *live* in bad faith, which does not mean that he does not have abrupt awakenings to cynicism or to, good faith, but which implies a constant and particular style of life. Our embarrassment then appears extreme since we can neither reject nor comprehend bad faith.

66. As for Sartre, what theory does the passage mainly concern?  
A) Bad faith.  
B) Lie in general.  
C) Good faith.
67. Compared to lying, the one who practices bad faith is \_\_\_\_\_.  
A) hiding a truth  
B) presenting a truth  
C) hiding a pleasing truth
68. As for Sartre, \_\_\_\_\_ contains the duality of the deceiver and the deceived.  
A) an original intention  
B) a project of bad faith  
C) lie in general
69. In Sartre' view, \_\_\_\_\_ swings between cynicism and good faith?  
A) psychic system  
B) consciousness

C) bad Faith

70. Does Sartre think bad faith and lie have the same ontological structure?

A) Yes, he does.

B) No, he doesn't.

C) Not sure.

### III

So far we have examined the Apollonian and Dionysiac states as the product of formative forces arising directly from nature without the mediation of the human artist. At this stage artistic urges are satisfied directly, on the one hand through the imagery of dreams, whose perfection is quite independent of the intellectual rank, the artistic development of the individual; on the other hand, through an ecstatic reality which once again takes no account of the individual and may even destroy him, or else redeem him through a mystical experience of the collective. In relation to these immediate creative conditions of nature every artist must appear as “imitator”, either as the Apollonian dream artist or the Dionysiac ecstatic artist, or, finally (as in Greek tragedy, for example) as dream and ecstatic artist in one. We might picture to ourselves how the last of these, in a state of Dionysiac intoxication and mystical self-abrogation, wandering apart from the reveling throng, sinks upon the ground, and how there is then revealed to him his own condition — complete oneness with the essence of the universe—in a dream similitude.

Having set down these general premises and distinctions, we now turn to the Greeks in order to realize to what degree the formative forces of nature were developed in them. Such an inquiry will enable us to assess properly the relation of the Greek artist to his prototypes or, to use Aristotle's expression, his “imitation of nature.” Of the dreams the Greeks dreamed it is not possible to speak with any certainty, despite the extant dream literature and the large number of dream anecdotes. But considering the incredible accuracy of their eyes, their keen and unabashed delight in colors, one can hardly be wrong in assuming that their dreams too showed a strict consequence of lines and contours, hues and groupings, a progression of scenes similar to their best bas-reliefs. The perfection of these dream scenes might almost tempt us to consider the dreaming Greek as a Homer and Homer as a dreaming Greek; which would be as though the modern man were to compare himself in his dreaming to Shakespeare.

Yet there is another point about which we do not have to conjecture at all: I mean the profound gap separating the Dionysiac Greeks from the Dionysiac barbarians. Throughout the range of ancient civilization (leaving the newer civilizations out of account for the moment) we find evidence of Dionysiac celebrations which stand to the Greek type in much the same relation as the bearded satyr, whose name and attributes

are derived from the hegoat, stands to the god Dionysus. The central concern of such celebrations was, almost universally, a complete sexual promiscuity overriding every form of established tribal law; all the savage urges of the mind were unleashed on those occasions until they reached that paroxysm of lust and cruelty which has always struck me as the “witches cauldron” *par excellence*.

71. As for Nietzsche, what theory does the passage mainly concern?
  - A) The Apollonian spirit.
  - B) The Dionysiac spirit.
  - C) The Greeks.
72. The nature of Dionysus is \_\_\_\_\_.
  - A) mystical
  - B) ecstasy
  - C) dream
73. The nature of Apollo is \_\_\_\_\_.
  - A) mystical
  - B) ecstasy
  - C) dream
74. What's the aim that Nietzsche investigates the Greeks?
  - A) To assess the relation of the Greek artist to his prototypes.
  - B) To make clear of how the formative forces of nature is developed.
  - C) Both A) and B).
75. Which of the following can we infer from the passage?
  - A) There is a gap between Dionysiac Greeks and Dionysiac barbarians.
  - B) There is a meditation between the Apollonian state and Dionysiac state.
  - C) There is no relation between the imagery of dreams and an ecstatic reality.

五、请将下列英文哲学文献中划线的句子译成汉语。（每题 5 分，共 40 分）

Let us take as an example the metaphysical term “principle” (in the sense of principle of being, not principle of knowledge or axiom). (76) Various metaphysicians offer an answer to the question which is the (highest) “principle of the world” (or of “things, “of “existence”, of “being”), e. g. water, number, form, motion, life, the spirit, the idea, the unconscious. activity, the good, and so forth. (77) In order to discover the meaning of the word “principle” in this metaphysical question we must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a statement of the form “x is the principle of y” would be true and under what conditions it would be false. In other words: we ask for the criteria of application or for the definition of the word “principle”. The metaphysician replies approximately as follows: “x is the principle of y” is to mean “y

arises out of x,” “the being of y rests on the being of x,” “y exists by virtue of x” and so forth. But these words are ambiguous and vague. Frequently they have a clear meaning; e.g. we say of a thing or process y that it “arises out of” x when we observe that things or processes of kind x are frequently or invariably followed by things or processes of kind y (causal connection in the sense of a lawful succession). (78) But the metaphysician tells us that he does not mean this empirically observable relationship. For in that case his metaphysical theses would be merely empirical propositions of the same kind as those of physics. (79) The expression “arising from” is not to mean here a relation of temporal and causal sequence, which is what the word ordinarily means. Yet, no criterion is specified for any other meaning. (80) Consequently, the alleged “metaphysical” meaning, which the word is supposed to have here in contrast to the mentioned empirical meaning, does not exist. If we reflect on the original meaning of the word “principium” (and of the corresponding Greek word “ἀρχή”, we notice the same development. (81) The word is explicitly deprived of its original meaning “beginning”; it is not supposed to mean the temporally prior any more, but the prior in some other, specifically metaphysical, respect. (82) The criteria for this “metaphysical respect,” however, are lacking. In both cases, then, the word has been deprived of its earlier meaning without being given a new meaning: there remains the word as an empty shell. From an earlier period of significant use, it is still associatively connected with various mental images; these in turn get associated with new mental images and feelings in the new context of usage. (83) But the word does not thereby become meaningful; and it remains meaningless as long as no method of verification can be described.

六、请从以下两段中文短文中，任选一段译成英文。(每题 20 分，共 20 分)

## I

中国民族自古以来从不把人看作高于一切，在哲学文艺方面的表现都反映出人在自然界中与万物占着一个比例较为恰当的地位，而非绝对统治万物的主宰。因此我们的苦闷，基本上比西方人为少为小；因为苦闷的强弱原是随欲望与野心的大小而转移的。农业社会的人比工业社会的人享受差得多；因此欲望也小得多。况中国古代素来以不滞于物，不为物役为最主要的人生哲学。

## II



尽管说哲学不是科学很难为人们所接受，对于以哲学为职业的人尤其如此，然而只要有一点儿哲学史知识的人都知道，这实在是一个具有历史意义的事实。2000多年来，哲学家们几乎在所有的哲学问题都争论不休，甚至在哲学的对象问题上也难有定论。虽然我们都希望哲学是科学，都认为哲学应该是科学，但是它的的确确并不具备一门科学知识应该具有的基本特征。